Abstract-"Cognitive radio" is an emerging technique to improve the utilization of radio frequency spectrum in wireless networks. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary users. We formulate this problem as an oligopoly market competition and use a Cournot game to obtain the spectrum allocation for secondary users. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. We first present the formulation of a static Cournot game for the case when all secondary users can observe the adopted strategies and the payoff of each other. However, this assumption may not be realistic in some cognitive radio systems. Therefore, we formulate a dynamic Cournot game in which the strategy of one secondary user is selected solely based on the pricing information obtained from the primary user. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum sharing scheme is investigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frequency spectrum, which is the scarcest resource for wireless communications, may become congested to accommodate diverse type of users, applications, and air interfaces in the next generation wireless networks. The concepts of software defined radio and cognitive radio were introduced to enhance the efficiency of frequency spectrum usage [1] . Software radio improves the capability of a wireless transceiver by using embedded software to enable the radio transceiver to operate in multiple frequency bands by using multiple transmission protocols. Cognitive radio is a special type of software defined radio which is able to estimate the communication parameters (e.g., spectrum sharing and allocation) and can intelligently adapt itself to the changing environment. Intelligent decision making algorithms are keys to the implementation of cognitive radio to achieve the desired system objectives (e.g., maximize throughput and channel utilization).
An introduction to cognitive radio techniques was provided in [2] where the fundamental cognitive tasks as well as the emergent behavior of cognitive radio were discussed. In [3] , a comprehensive survey of the functionalities and research challenges in cognitive radio networks (also referred to as NeXt Generation (xG) networks) was presented. The key functions and implementation aspects for this xG network including spectrum management, spectrum mobility, and spectrum sharing were discussed. Dynamic spectrum sharing is a challenging problem in cognitive radio network due to the requirement of "peaceful" coexistence of both licensed and unlicensed users as well as the availability of wide range of radio spectrum. Decision theory (e.g., Markov decision process, game theory) has been identified as one of the key techniques for designing cognitive radio [2] . Single-player decision making technique was used for this in the literature. For example, a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) was used for dynamic spectrum access in an ad hoc network [4] . An opportunistic spectrum access method was developed to allow secondary users to access the radio spectrum by using a decentralized cognitive medium access control (MAC) protocol. On the other hand, game theory can be used for multi-player optimization to achieve individual optimal solution. In [5] , a game-theoretic adaptive channel allocation scheme was proposed for cognitive radio networks.
In this paper, we consider the problem of dynamic spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio network. In such an environment, there is a primary user allocated with a licensed radio spectrum the utilization of which could be improved by sharing it with the secondary users. We formulate this spectrum sharing problem as an oligopoly market in which a few firms compete with each other in terms of amount of commodity supplied to the market to gain the maximum profit. In this case the secondary users are analogous to the firms who compete for the spectrum offered by the primary user and the cost of the spectrum is determined by using a pricing function. A Cournot game is used to analyze this situation and the Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. The main objective of this Cournot game formulation is to maximize the profit of all secondary users based on the equilibrium adopted by all secondary users. However, the parameter of the pricing function offered by the primary user can be adjusted to maximize its revenue as well.
We first consider that case where all of the secondary users can completely observe the strategies adopted by each user and the corresponding payoffs. A static Cournot game is used and the Nash equilibrium can be obtained in a centralized fashion. However, in some practical systems this assumption may not be valid (e.g., where the secondary users are out of transmission range of each other and they can only communicate with the primary user). For these scenarios, we use a dynamic Cournot game in which selection of the strategy by a secondary user is based only on the pricing information from the primary user. With this spectrum sharing scheme, we study the stability condition for the Nash equilibrium by using local stability analysis.
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II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS

A. Primary and Secondary Users
We consider a wireless system with a primary user and multiple secondary users (i.e., total number of secondary users is denoted by N ) who want to share the spectrum allocated to the primary user (Fig. 1) . In this case, the primary user is willing to share some portion of the spectrum (b i ) with secondary user i. The primary user charges the secondary user for the spectrum at a rate of c(b) per unit bandwidth, where b is the amount of available bandwidth that can be shared. After allocation, the secondary users transmit in the allocated spectrum using adaptive modulation to enhance the transmission performance. The revenue of secondary user i is denoted by r i per unit of achievable transmission rate. 
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B. Wireless Transmission
With adaptive modulation, the transmission rate can be dynamically adjusted based on the channel quality. For uncoded quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) with square constellation (e.g., 4-QAM, 16-QAM) the bit-error-rate (BER) in single-input single-output Gaussian noise channel can be well approximated as follows [6] :
where γ is the SNR at the receiver and k is the spectral efficiency of the modulation scheme used. Without loss of generality, we assume that the spectral efficiency is a non-negative real number. To guarantee the quality of transmission, BER must be maintained at the target level (i.e., BER tar i ). The spectral efficiency of the transmission for secondary user i can be obtained from
where
We assume that the received SNR information is available at the transmitter by channel estimation. In short, for secondary user i, given the received SNR γ i , target BER tar i , and assigned spectrum b i , the transmission rate (in bits per second) can be obtained.
C. Oligopoly Market Competition and Cournot Game
We model the problem of spectrum sharing as an oligopoly market competition. In economics, oligopoly is defined as a situation where a small number of firms (i.e., oligopolists) dominate a particular market. In this market structure, firms compete with each other independently to achieve their objectives (i.e., maximize profit) by controlling the quantity or the price of the supplied commodity. The decision of each firm is influenced by other firms' actions and action of one firm can be observed by other firms. This situation can be modeled by a Cournot game.
The spectrum sharing problem can be modeled as an oligopoly market competition in which the secondary users (i.e., the firms) compete to share the bandwidth offered by the primary user (i.e., the market). The firms here compete with each other in terms of requested spectrum size (i.e., the product quantity). The profit of a firm can be computed from the price charged by the primary user and the benefits gained from utilizing the allocated spectrum. All the firms compete to achieve the highest profit.
III. SPECTRUM SHARING SCHEME
In this section, we formulate the problem of spectrum sharing among the primary user and multiple secondary users as an oligopoly market competition. A static Cournot game model is presented for the ideal case where all secondary users can completely observe the strategies and the payoffs of other secondary users. Afterwards, to relax this assumption, a dynamic Cournot game model is presented for which the information of other secondary users are unknown to a particular secondary user. In this scenario, a secondary user observes the change in payoff due to the different charging price from the primary user and adapts its strategy accordingly. Note that, the objective of this spectrum sharing is to maximize the profit of secondary users by utilizing the concept of equilibrium.
A. Static Cournot Game
Based on this system model, a Cournot game can be formulated as follows. The players (i.e., firms in the oligopoly market) in this game are the secondary users. The strategy of each of the players corresponds to the allocated spectrum size (denoted by b i for secondary user i) which is non-negative. The payoff for each player is the profit (i.e., revenue minus cost) of secondary user i (denoted by p i ) in sharing the spectrum with the primary user and other secondary users. Note that, the commodity of this oligopoly market is the frequency spectrum.
For the primary user, we assume that the pricing function used to charge the secondary users is given by
where x, y, and z are non-negative constants, τ ≥ 1 (so that this pricing function is convex), and B denotes the set of strategies of all secondary users (i.e., B = {b 1 , . . . b N }). Let w denote the worth of the spectrum for the primary user. Then, the condition c(B) > w × j b j is necessary to ensure that the primary user is willing to share spectrum of size b with the secondary users. Note that, the primary user charges all of the secondary users at the same price.
The revenue of the secondary user i can be obtained from r i × k i × b i , while the cost of spectrum allocation is b i c(b). Therefore, the profit of the secondary user i can be obtained as follows:
Assume that the guard band used to separate the spectrum allocated to different users is fixed and small. Then, the profit can be rewritten as follows:
The marginal profit function for secondary user i can be obtained from
Let B −i denote the set of strategies adopted by all except secondary user i (i.e., B −i = {b j |j = 1, . . . , N; j = i} and
In this case, the optimal allocated spectrum size to one secondary user depends on the strategies of other secondary users. Therefore, Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of the game to ensure that all secondary users are satisfied with the solution. By definition, Nash equilibrium of a game is a strategy profile (list of strategies, one for each player) with the property that no player can increase his payoff by choosing a different action, given the other players' actions [7] . In this case, the Nash equilibrium is obtained by using the best response function which is the best strategy of one player given others' strategies. The best response function of secondary user i given the allocated spectrum size of other secondary users b j , where j = i, is defined as follows:
The set B * = {b * 1 , . . . b * N } denotes the Nash equilibrium of this game if and only if
where B * −i denotes the set of best responses for secondary users j for j = i. Mathematically, to obtain Nash equilibrium, we have to solve the following set of equations
However, solving the above set of equations to obtain Nash equilibrium is not straightforward and a numerical method is required. In this paper, we use Nelder-Mead direct search method [9] to obtain the Nash equilibrium (i.e., allocated spectrum size b * i ). We formulate an optimization problem with the objective defined as follows:
That is, we want to minimize the difference between decision variables b i and the corresponding best response function. Note that, the minimum value of the objective function is zero if the algorithm reaches the Nash equilibrium.
B. Dynamic Cournot Game
In a practical cognitive radio environment, secondary users may only be able to observe the pricing information from the primary user but not the strategies and profits of other secondary users. Therefore, we have to obtain Nash equilibrium of each secondary user based on the interaction with the primary user only. Since all secondary users are rational to maximize their profits, they can adjust the spectrum size b i based on the marginal profit function. In this case, each secondary user communicates with the primary user to obtain the differentiated pricing function for different strategies. The adjustment of the allocated spectrum size can be modeled as a repeated Cournot game as follows:
where b i (t + 1) is the allocated spectrum size at time t, α i is the speed adjustment parameter (i.e., learning rate) of secondary user i. The dynamic model of this repeated Cournot game can be expressed as in (12).
C. Local Stability Analysis
Let us consider the case where τ = 1, that is, the pricing function of the primary user is linear. Note that, this linear pricing function (which corresponds to a linear inverse demand function) is a common assumption for an oligopoly market. With this, the repeated Cournot game can be expressed in the matrix form as follows [8] :
At the equilibrium, we have b(t + 1) = b(t) = b, namely, b = S(b), where S is the self-mapping function of fixed point b. With linear pricing function, the fixed point can be obtained by solving the set of equations
With two secondary users in the cognitive radio environment, we have fixed points b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 which can be expressed as follows:
where b 3 is the Nash equilibrium. We analyze local stability of this spectrum sharing based on localization by considering the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the mapping. By definition, the fixed point is stable if and only if the eigenvalues are all inside the unit circle of the complex plane (i.e., |λ i | < 1 for k = 1, . . . , N) [8] .
With two secondary users, there are two eigenvalues, and the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as in (16).
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Note that, the eigenvalues are given by the diagonal elements of J(.) if matrix J(.) is diagonal or triangular. The coordinate (0, 0) will be stable if
However, since x cannot be negative, we consider the case where 1 + α 1 (r 1 k 1 − x) < 1 and 1 + α 2 (r 2 k 2 − x) < 1. We reach the stability condition for b 0 as follows:
These conditions imply that when none of the secondary users is willing to share the spectrum (which corresponds to fixed point (0, 0)) the system is stable. That is, when the cost of the spectrum (as offered by the primary user) is higher than the revenue gained from allocated spectrum, a secondary user is willing to stay out of the system. For the fixed point b 1 , we have the Jacobian matrix expressed as in (19). For the first eigenvalue, it is possible to satisfy the condition |1 + α 1 (−r 1 k 1 + x)| < 1 or r 1 k1 > x. However, for the second eigenvalue, we have to evaluate the condition
Again, since x is non-negative, we consider only the case where
However, this is impossible since from (15) Nash equilibrium can only be obtained if
, 0 is never stable. Similarly, fixed point b 2 is never stable. For the fixed point b 3 , which is the Nash equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix can be expressed as follows:
Since this Jacobian matrix is neither diagonal nor triangular, the characteristic equation to obtain the eigenvalues is given as follows:
We can solve this by using the standard formula
. Basically, given r 1 , r 2 , k 1 , k 2 , x, and y, we can obtain the relationship between α 1 and α 2 so that the fixed point of Nash equilibrium is stable. When the Nash equilibrium is stable, the profit of the secondary users cannot be increased by altering the allocated spectrum size (i.e., marginal profit is zero).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Parameter Setting
We consider a cognitive radio environment with one primary user and two secondary users sharing a frequency spectrum of size 15 MHz. The target BER for both the users is BER tar
For the pricing function of primary user, we use x = 0 and y = 1, while τ is adjusted based on the evaluation scenario (e.g., τ = 1.0), and the worth of spectrum for primary user is w = 1. The revenue of a secondary user per unit transmission rate is r i = 10, ∀i. Fig. 2 shows the best response of both secondary users in the static Cournot game. The best response of each secondary user is a linear function of the other user's strategy. The Nash equilibrium is located at the point at which the best responses of both the users intersect. We observe that under different channel qualities, the Nash equilibrium is located at the different places. Since the secondary user can achieve higher transmission rate from the same spectrum size due to adaptive modulation, higher profit can be achieved, and consequently, a secondary user prefers to have a larger spectrum size. Also, the trajectory of spectrum sharing in the dynamic Cournot game is shown for the case of α 1 = α 2 = 0.14. Again, we observe that with the same speed adjustment parameter, better channel quality results in more fluctuations in the trajectory to the Nash equilibrium.
B. Numerical Results
Based on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix derived in (21), the relationship between α 1 and α 2 to provide stable spectrum sharing can be obtained. In particular, the stability regions in α 1 ,α 2 -plane for different channel qualities are shown in Fig. 3 . If α 1 and α 2 are set with the values in this region (i.e., region between the axes and the curve in Fig. 3 ), the spectrum sharing is stable and the Nash equilibrium will be reached. Otherwise, the sharing will be unstable, and fluctuations will occur.
The adaptation of Nash equilibrium under different channel qualities is presented in Fig. 4 . As expected, when the channel quality becomes better, spectrum size allocated to the secondary users becomes larger. Also, we observe that the channel quality of one secondary user impacts the allocated spectrum size for other secondary user. From these results, it is obvious that marginal profit can be used to achieve the Nash equilibrium for distributed spectrum sharing in a cognitive radio environment where the secondary users do not have the information on the strategies and the profits of other users. However, a proper setting of the speed adjustment parameter is required to ensure that the spectrum sharing is stable and it is able to reach the Nash equilibrium.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have proposed a competitive spectrum sharing scheme based on game theory for a cognitive radio network consisting of one primary user and multiple secondary users sharing the same frequency spectrum. First, we have modeled this spectrum sharing as an oligopoly market and a static Cournot game has been used to analyze and obtain the Nash equilibrium for the optimal allocated spectrum size for the secondary users. However, this static Cournot game is useful only when all the secondary users are able to observe the strategies and the payoffs of other secondary users. Afterwards, we have presented a dynamic Cournot game in which a secondary user adapts its spectrum sharing strategy by observing only the marginal profit which is a function of spectrum price offered by the primary user. We have analytically investigated the stability of this dynamic Cournot game using local stability theory. This spectrum sharing scheme will be useful for design and engineering of next generation cognitive wireless networks.
